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Plato’s unwritten doctrines: a discussion 
 
 
The Editor has received a letter from prof. Thomas Szlezák in connection to prof. Tanja 
Staehler’s paper Theuth versus Thamus: the esoteric Plato revisited, published in this Journal 
vol. 7 1 2013. We reproduce here both his letter and her response to it.  
      
 
 
(i) Tanja Staehler and the homonym „esoteric“ 
 
Thomas Alexander Szlezák    
Eberhard Karls Universität Tübingen 
 
  
In her article „Theuth Versus Thamus: The Esoteric Plato Revisited“ (Journal of 
Ancient Philosophy, Sao Paulo, v.7., n.1  pp. 65-94) Tanja Staehler presents a discussion of 
Leo Strauss´s approach to the Platonic dialogues together with that of the so-called Tübingen 
School, addressing thereby  the „two main esoteric approaches“. Obviously she has not 
realized that the word “esoteric”, if applied to these two ways to approach Plato, is a mere 
homonym.  
 Let us leave aside the well-known fact that the label ´Tübingen School´ is not a very 
helpful one, since there has never been in Tübingen  anything like a ´School´ with a  leader at 
the top and faithful followers working under his supervision. But as the originally polemic use 
of this label has given way in the last two decades to a more neutral and descriptive one, I´ll 
too use it on the following pages for the sake of brevity. 
 Staehler seems to believe that Krämer and Gaiser (and the numerous other adherents 
of the Tübingen School, which is by now an international enterprise with representatives in 
over a dozen of countries) recommend, as Friedrich Schleiermacher and innumerable others, 
among them Leo Strauss, did in the German (Schleiermacherian) tradition, a method of 
“esoteric reading”, i.e. of detecting hidden meanings “between the lines” or “behind the text”. 
But supplementing the Platonic text with a meaning not openly expressed is not what the 
Tübigen scholars aim at. They are rather concerned with the “Testimonia Platonica” (as 
collected and edited by Konrad Gaiser 1963 and by Marie-Dominique Richard 1986), more 
specifically, with their historic reliability, and with their philosophical significance and above 
all with their compatibility with the dialogues. Thus the Tübingen approach focuses both on 
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the dialogues themselves and on the “indirect transmission” of Plato´s philosophy, which 
testifies for an “esoteric” teaching in the Academy (which had of course nothing to do with 
any sort of “reading between the lines”). 
 Hence the confusion with regard to the term “esoteric”. 
 Staehler´s misunderstanding of the term “esoteric” is, on the one hand, so simple, and 
on the other hand, so widespread among those who do not take the trouble to read anything by 
Krämer or Gaiser, that it would not make sense to single out her article for a detailed 
examination of her numerous misconceptions. What prompts me to write a few remarks on 
that article is the presence of a number of statements about the Tübingen School that are 
presented as objective information, but are incorrect – i.e. not a matter of dispute or 
interpretation, but simply false. Here are some of them. 
 (1)  “Unlike the Tübingen School authors, Strauss is not exclusively a Plato scholar” 
(Staehler 74). As if Hans Krämer and Konrad Gaiser have not worked on any other themes 
than those in the narrow field of Platonic scholarship? Krämer has developped his own 
philosophy of ethics (Integrative Ethik, 1992) and of hermeneutics (Kritik der Hermeneutik, 
2007), moreover he has worked on modern anthropology and aesthetics (Anthropologie der 
Kunst, 1994) and on post-Platonic ancient philosophy (Der Ursprung der Geistmetaphysik, 
1964). If we compare Krämer and Strauss, as Staehler does, it is not unfair to say that 
Krämer´s philosophical horizon is broader, his intellectual achievements more original than 
those of  Strauss. –  Konrad Gaiser was a leading experts on Menander and the 4th century 
New Comedy and published important contributions to Thucydidean scholarship and other 
chapters of the Greek History of Ideas.  
 For both Krämer and Gaiser there exist printed and internet bibliographies. It is 
surprising that a scholar of the younger generation should degrade Krämer and Gaiser – two 
giants of 20th century Geisteswissenschaften – to “exclusively Plato scholars” without 
consulting information easily accessible from a personal computer. (As to the third 
representative of the Tübingen School, against whom Staehler´s article is mainly directed (69) 
– namely the author of the present remarks –, I leave it to the reader to find out whether he, at 
least, is “exclusively a Plato scholar”.) 
 (2) “The traditional representatives of the Tübingen School, Krämer and Gaiser, do not 
provide a detailed interpretation of the critique of writing” (Staehler 81). This too is simply 
wrong. Platonic scholarship owes to Konrad Gaiser a detailed and most valuable interpreta-
tion of the critique of writing in his Naples lectures of 1982: “Platone come scrittore 
filosofico”, Napoli 1984, 77-101, the original German text of which has been available for the 
Journal of Ancient Philosophy 
ISSN 1981-9471 - FFLCH/USP 
www.revistas.usp.br/filosofiaantiga
J. anc. philos. (Engl. ed.), São Paulo, v.8, n.2. p. 160-166, 2014.
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.11606/issn.1981-9471.v8i2p160-166
161 
past 10 years (Konrad Gaiser, Gesammelte Schriften, 2004, 29-41). (Staehler doesn´t list this 
important volume, indeed an indispensable tool of research, in her bibliography.) Krämer had 
discussed Plato´s critique of writing already in his 1959 dissertation (Arete bei Platon und 
Aristoteles, 393-396), then came back to it in Museum Helveticum 21, 1964, 148-154. 
Concise as Krämer´s observations are, they are more detailed and fruitful than Staehler´s 
wholly inadequate discussion of hte critique of writing on pp. 85 ff. 
 (3) Staehler repeatedly describes the method of Krämer and Gaiser as a “turning away 
from the Platonic dialogues” (72, 82), or claims that they “turn away from the dialogues (or 
turn to them mainly in order to point to inconsistencies with the “unwritten doctrine”)” (68). 
Krämer and Gaiser turning away from the dialogues? The above quoted “Gesammelte 
Schriften” of Gaiser are enough to prove the contrary (but Staehler obviously never came 
across this volume). Krämer´s Collected Platonic Studies are going to appear in 2014 – but to 
find at least some of his numerous interpretations of specific passages in the dialogues should 
not be too difficult even without this forthcoming collection. What is more: the only two 
volumes by Krämer and Gaiser that made it into Staehler´s rudimentary bibliography, namely 
“Arete bei Platon und Aristoteles” and “Platons ungeschriebene Lehre”, devote, each of them,  
more than half of their contents to careful interpretations of the dialogues. How can somebody 
who has access to these books maintain that their authors “turn away from the dialogues”? 
Even more surprising is the second claim that the Tübingen School turns to the dialogues, if it 
does so at all, “mainly in order to point to inconsistencies with the ´unwritten doctrine´”. As 
everybody knows, one of the main arguments of the Tübingen scholars for the authenticity of 
the Aristotelean (and other) reports about Plato´s oral philosophy of principles is their full 
compatibility with the dialogues. See e.g. Th. A. Szlezák, “The Idea of the Good as Arkhē in 
Plato´s Republic”, in: D. Nikulin (ed.), The Other Plato. The Tübingen Interpretation of 
Plato´s Inner-Academic Teachings, SUNY Press 2012, 121-142.  
 (4) “The Tübingen School in particular tends to read the critique of writing as 
demanding a dismissal of writing” (Staehler 90). One wonders which text (if any) of a 
representative of the Tübingen School Staehler might have had in mind when she wrote this. 
(She abstains, as usual, from giving a reference.) According to the Tübingen interpretation, 
the Phaedrus nowhere dismisses writing; it just shows its limits as a tool of philosophical 
communication. 
 (5) Several times Staehler attempts to sum up the hermeneutical position of the 
Tübingen School as an attempt to ascribe to Plato an intention “to hide something”, or “to 
conceal certain messages” (71, 77, 78, 79). She believes this tendency to be common to the 
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“two esoteric approaches”, viz. the Straussian and the Tübingen approach, and at the same 
time something which would seperate them from the hermeneutics of Schleiermacher (70 f.). 
Here the confusion is complete: none of the three hermeneutic positions is being represented 
correctly by Staehler. It was Schleiermacher who believed that Plato wanted, by the method 
he dubbed “(Plato´s) indirect communication”, to conceal certain messages, so that they can 
only be grasped by the alert reader, and not by the unphilosophical one (see Schleiermacher´s 
“Einleitung” to the first volume of his “Platon, Sämtliche Werke”, Berlin 1804, pp. 16 and 
30). This belief we find also in Strauss – small wonder, since it was the standard Schleier-
macherian creed of German Platonists in the 1920-ies, when Strauss received his academic 
formation in the universities of Marburg, Frankfurt, Berlin and Hamburg. Staehler has not 
understood that Strauss is, from the hermeneutical point of view, one among the German 
emigrants who found jobs in the United States and remained faithful to what they had learnt 
in their youth. (What is peculiar about Strauss is his political message, not his hermeneutics.) 
The Tübingen School, on the other side, is not part of the Schleiermacherian mainstream. Its 
representatives do not believe in Plato´s “intention to hide something”. Plato does not “hide” 
his theory of principles, he keeps it out of his writings, refers it to a different context, namely 
to the context of orality. The semantic difference between “to hide something” and “to keep 
something out of something” or “to refer something to a different context” should be clear: 
when an author wants to hide something, he will not point to the content he is about to hide 
(and Schleiermacher understood the allegedly Platonic “indirect communication” precisely in 
this way). Plato´s procedure is different: he makes Socrates claim that he does have an own 
view on the ti estin of the Good, and at the same time he lets him stop short of communicating 
this view (Republic 506 e). It would be utterly misleading to speak here of Plato´s “hiding a 
certain message”. Instead, we should acknowledge that Plato refers in this and in all similar 
passages the philosophically most important question to another context: to the context where 
the author would, as the “father of the logos” (patēr tou logou), orally (legōn autos) expound 
his “things of greater value” (his timiōtera). See Phaedrus 275 e, 278 cd. 
 
 I stop here, although there are many more erroneous statements in Staehler´s article. 
Particularly annoying is her attempt to construe a “traditional Tübingen School” that would be 
opposed to my position, and her constant allegation that her opponents give an uncomplete 
exegesis. It is she who says nothing on Phaedrus 276 b – 278 e, nothing on the Seventh Letter 
(except for a footnote “explaining” why she shuns an interpretation), and finally nothing on 
the Aristotelean reports about Plato´s theory of principles, which are for her nothing but 
Journal of Ancient Philosophy 
ISSN 1981-9471 - FFLCH/USP 
www.revistas.usp.br/filosofiaantiga
J. anc. philos. (Engl. ed.), São Paulo, v.8, n.2. p. 160-166, 2014.
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.11606/issn.1981-9471.v8i2p160-166
163 
“short, rare, and overall not very elucidating remarks of other ancient authors” (72). Can we 
be sure that Staehler has ever studied either the Testimonia Platonica or Léon Robin´s 
coherent and fascinating interpretation  of these “short and rare remarks” in his splendid “La 
théorie platonicienne des idées et des nombres d´après Aristote” (Paris 1908)? 
 Although one of Krämer´s books, one of Gaiser´s and one of mine are listed in 
Staehler´s bibliography, the overall impression left by her portrait of the Tübingen School is 
that her knowledge of this ´School´ is derived from other sources than these three books. 
Books that contain close interpretations of the dialogues should not be denigrated as “turning 
away from the dialogues”. 
 
 
(ii) Response to Szlezák 
 
Tanya Staehler 
University of Sussex 
 
 
 
Szlezák accuses me of using the term “esoteric” as a mere homonym. In fact, the 
approach of my article is open to such an outcome since it is the purpose of my article to trace 
similarities and differences between the Straussians and the Tübingen School. Yet despite the 
fact that there are quite a number of crucial differences between the two approaches, the 
outcome is nonetheless that the usage is not that of a homonym. More precisely, I introduce 
“esoteric” by way of Szlezák’s own definition (“conveying knowledge in a way which is 
strictly orientated toward the needs of the addressee” (PSP, 406; cited on p. 69)), and it seems 
to me, based on the examination conducted in my article, that this definition certainly works 
perfectly for the Straussians as well.  
Yet even if the outcome had been that the two approaches are referred to as esoteric 
but turn out to hold an entirely different meaning of this term, it would not have been 
detrimental to my article. In general, it was the purpose of my essay to begin from the 
traditional understanding or perception of these approaches and investigate them. This 
common perception was also the basis for my claim that the Tübingen School representatives 
are mostly Plato scholars, unlike Strauss who holds a much more diverse and problematic 
reputation. Yet it is true that I should have formulated more carefully at that moment, 
differentiating between “being” and “being perceived as”. 
Journal of Ancient Philosophy 
ISSN 1981-9471 - FFLCH/USP 
www.revistas.usp.br/filosofiaantiga
J. anc. philos. (Engl. ed.), São Paulo, v.8, n.2. p. 160-166, 2014.
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.11606/issn.1981-9471.v8i2p160-166
164 
In general, it seems to me that in relation to most of Szlezák’s points of criticism, it is 
important to bear in mind that my article represents and examines (a) a common conception 
which is submitted to a (b) comparative perspective. While there might be problems with 
comparative studies in general and in particular, it is quite important to consider the 
comparative aspect of my article since it helps clarify some of the statements Szlezák picks 
out as problematic. For example, when I speak of “turning away from the dialogues”, I do not 
mean a complete turning away, by any means, but turning away more so than the Straussians, 
and also more so than Szlezák himself whom I single out as a much more successful reader of 
the Platonic dialogues than his predecessors. In short, it seems to me that even though Krämer 
and Gaiser certainly do not turn away from the dialogues entirely, they attend to them mostly 
as texts which they relate to the ideas of the unwritten doctrine. In this sense, the unwritten 
doctrine emerges as the framework of reading and the standard for the dialogues as texts 
whereas attending to the dialogues as dialogues allows attending much more fully to their 
rich, lively, multi-faceted nature in which, for example, the ambiguity of writing can be 
discerned. 
Particularly interesting is to my mind the topic of hiding. Szlezák states that the 
Tübingen School never assigns such hiding of insights to Plato, but Szlezák himself writes, 
for example, that Plato “held back certain important insights” (PSP, 340). Szlezák states that 
there is a crucial difference between “’to hide something’ and ‘to keep something out of 
something’ or ‘to refer something to a different context’”. Yet it seems to me that if something 
is kept out of something and the reader is referred to a different context, yet not told what or 
where this context is, this comes quite close to a phenomenology of hiding – even more so if 
it turns out, as it does in this case, that the Tübingen scholars, with the help of other scholars, 
have found what was kept out. 
The role of Schleiermacher in relation to these two approaches is indeed a complex 
one; but I have pointed out quite explicitly that Strauss is closer to Schleiermacher (p. 77). 
The remainder of my discussion of Schleiermacher’s approach is done very much on 
Szlezák’s terms (pp. 69-71), including the discussion of a certain tension in Szlezák’s work 
that emerges from integrating some Schleiermacherian elements while rejecting others (p. 72). 
When it comes to the issue of a detailed reading, I do not believe that 12 pages in 
Gaiser and 9 pages in Krämer qualify as detailed. Of course, I also do not believe that my 
article, which is already doing a bit too much, could provide such a reading. To my mind, 
detailed readings have been provided by scholars such as Hans-Georg Gadamer and Martin 
Heidegger (esp. Gesamtausgabe vol. 19). My background is admittedly a phenomenological-
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hermeneutical one, but it seems to me that assessing the two main esoteric approaches from a 
certain distance rather than belonging to one of them proves useful, and would in fact be the 
only possible starting point for such a comparison.  
A detailed reading is also provided by Szlezák himself, and I am sorry to have 
“annoyed” Szlezák by singling out his work as far more successful than his predecessors, in 
terms of clarity, accessibility, explicit methodology, and close attention given to the dialogues 
(p. 69 etc.). His rejection of the separation created by me between his work and those of 
Gaiser and Krämer might at least serve to confirm a certain unity among the Tübingen 
thinkers. His perception that I see the representatives of the Tübingen School as my 
“opponents” is misplaced. In particular, I do not argue “against” Szlezák, as he puts it, but 
actually for him, ascribing to him a “return to the dialogues” (p. 73). But I understand that this 
is not what Szlezák desires me to do, and I will refrain from such attempts in the future. The 
misunderstandings debated here could, to my mind, at least serve as a general reminder that 
an interpretation that focuses on author’s intentions can easily be flawed, especially if it 
ascribes intentions of arguing “against” somebody when there are none. 
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